Financial information that meets the needs of the user must be accurate, sufficient, timely and
reliable. Consequently, national laws and international auditing standards require the auditor to
provide confidence in the audited financial information. To achieve this, the auditor independence
must be ensured. However, the auditor independence is influenced by various factors such as the
provision of non-audit services, audit fees, audit time, etc. This article identifies the factors that
affect the auditor independence in financial statements audit in Vietnam at present, so there are
some suggestions to improve the quality of financial statements audit. Using a questionnaire
instrument, Viet Nam interested parties’ perceptions of the influence on auditor independence of
a large set of 26 factors are elicited. Most factors have a significant influence on independence
perceptions for all groups. The principal threat factors relate to audit fee, audit tenure and nonaudit service provision, while the principal enhancement factors relate to risks to auditor arising
from poor-quality audit and disclosure of financial relations.
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estigate differences in the views of the two groups on the extent to which
factors influence their independence, the study used the Independent Sample T - test. With
95% confidence, Sig value. <0.05 is considered to be a difference in opinion between the
two groups. Accordingly, the results show that there are 17 factors that differ from one
another in the two groups in Table 3.
Table 3. Results of t - test
Factors Mean
Std.
Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
TK1. Auditor has been auditing the client for more
than 3 years
Auditors 2,41 ,940 ,110
Users 2,22 ,815 ,115
TK2. Partner has been auditing the client for more
than 3 years
Auditors 2,42 ,956 ,112
Users 2,30 ,909 ,129
TK3. Audit firm has been auditing the client for
more than 5 years
Auditors 2,81 ,828 ,097
Users 2,34 ,917 ,130
DV1. Non-audit services fee from incubent >=
100% audit fee
Auditors 1,92 ,662 ,077
Users 2,02 ,685 ,097
DV2. Non-audit services fee from incubent from
50% to 100% audit fee
Auditors 2,29 ,905 ,106
Users 1,98 ,654 ,093
DV3. Non-audit services fee from incubent from
25% to under 50% audit fee
Auditors 2,81 ,923 ,108
Users 2,14 ,833 ,118
DV4. Audit firms and auditors seek and appoint
majority personnel for the client
Auditors 2,38 ,892 ,104
Users 1,78 ,582 ,082
P1. Partner’s income depends on the retention of a
specific client
Auditors 2,34 ,853 ,100
Users 1,90 ,839 ,119
P2. >=10 percent of total firm revenues from one
client
Auditors 2,58 ,644 ,075
Users 2,16 ,792 ,112
QH1. The time lapse between auditing and working
for a client firm <= 30 months
Auditors 2,45 ,817 ,096
Users 2,32 ,819 ,116
QH2. The time lapse between auditing and working
for a client firm <= 30 months
Auditors 2,44 ,866 ,101
Users 2,34 ,798 ,113
QH3. The rank of the ex-auditor who accepts
employment with a client firm
Auditors 2,56 ,799 ,094
Users 2,64 ,776 ,110
UB. The existence of audit committee Auditors 3,89 1,048 ,123
Users 3,72 1,070 ,151
CT1. Competitive audit fee among audit firms Auditors 2,11 ,809 ,095
456
Factors Mean
Std.
Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
Users 2,52 ,677 ,096
CT2. Auditor’s desire not to lose status by losing
key client
Auditors 2,47 ,668 ,078
Users 2,20 ,728 ,103
CT3. Competitive audit fee among audit firms Auditors 2,64 ,537 ,063
Users 2,22 ,840 ,119
CT4. Budget pressures imposed by audit firm on staff Auditors 2,18 ,839 ,098
Users 2,60 ,639 ,090
CT5. Being a big four international firm, being a big
size company, being a member international audit firm
Auditors 3,84 ,687 ,080
Users 3,92 ,724 ,102
CT6. Small local audit firm Auditors 2,37 ,717 ,084
Users 2,44 ,644 ,091
RR1. Risk of litigation against auditor Auditors 3,90 ,748 ,088
Users 4,18 ,720 ,102
RR2. Risk to auditor of disciplinary action by
professional body
Auditors 4,16 ,764 ,089
Users 3,84 ,792 ,112
RR3. Risk of damage to auditors’ reputation from
public scandals
Auditors 4,23 ,773 ,090
Users 3,90 ,707 ,100
RR4. Risk to auditor of loss of practicing certificate Auditors 3,77 ,698 ,082
Users 4,04 ,699 ,099
CK1. Disclosure of non-audit services Auditors 3,45 ,867 ,101
Users 4,08 ,853 ,121
CK2. Disclosure of audit fees Auditors 3,41 ,847 ,099
Users 4,16 ,681 ,096
CK3. Disclosure of non - audit fees Auditors 3,44 1,014 ,119
Users 4,10 ,909 ,129
In general, 17 factors have different viewpoints, there are 10 threatening factors
and 7 factors that increase the auditor independence. Among factors that differ from one
another, it is possible to see factors such as (TK 3), (P1), (P2), (DV3), (DV4), (CT1), (CT3),
(CT4), (CK1), (CK2), (CK3) are the biggest difference with Sig value at T-Test <0.01. Users
rated higher threat in 8 threatening factors of independence (TK3, DV2, DV3, DV4, P1, P2,
CT2, CT3) and evaluated the higher increase in the five factors that increased independence
from auditors (RR1, RR4, CK1, CK2, CK3). This difference can be explained by two
reasons: firstly, is derived from the delegated theory; secondly, the characteristics of the
457
operations of Vietnamese audit firms, together with the qualifications and experiences of the
surveyed subjects.
Derived from delegated theory, because users are not directly involved in the
process of auditing the financial statements of auditor, therefore, they found that the audit
tenure of an audit firm for a client was too long (for over 5 years, auditors will become more
comfortable with their clients, reduce their professional skepticism, and reduce their
diligence in finding audit evidence ), non-audit services such as non-audit services fee from
incubent over 25% or more audit fee (for the user is large, the auditor can defy to obtain this
very high fee), audit fee (>=10 percent of total firm revenues from one client) or an audit
firm providing human services (can dominate the audit) has a higher level of threat to
independence. On the other hand, they also expect factors that increase independence higher
than those of auditors. The five factors undermining independence are informations which
users desired to be published so that the auditor independence can be considered and assessed
more specifically, this can be a pressure on the auditors to ensure independence, to satisfy
the requirements of the users.
Derived from the characteristics of the operations of the Vietnamese audit firms,
the pressures experienced by audit firms in the performance of their work such as budget
pressures, competition among foreign enterprises .... This can cause unhealthy competition,
reduce the auditor independence and reduce the quality of auditing financial statements.
On the other hand, due to the level and experience of the respondents, the subjective
assessment of factors may also make a big difference between the two groups.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
In summary, by synthesizing and analyzing the results of the survey of factors
affecting the auditor independence, the author gives some comments as follows:
First, the H1a and H1b hypotheses are proven. Basically, both groups of
respondents stated that there are 17 factors that threaten independence and 9 factors that
increase independence in line with the hypothesis although there are differences in threat
ranking or independence in each factor.
Second, reject the H2 hypothesis. Independence testing with 95% confidence
intervals showed a difference in viewpoint between the two groups of 17 factors (Sig <0.05),
including 10 threat factors and 7 factors that increase the auditor independence. The most
obvious difference was found in 11 factors with Sig value <0.01. In general, users rated
higher levels of threat in 8 factors of independence and assessed the higher levels of increase
in 5 factors of independence than those of the auditor.
The study has possible practical and policy implications.
Firstly, the results of the study can inform policy makers, governments, and
professional accounting bodies in emerging markets in countries that share similar
economic, political, and cultural environment on how policies and frameworks related to
PAI can be structured to ensure adequate regulation of the capital market. Specifically: The
458
regulator should issue documents clearly regulating the rotation of auditors in line with the
regulations in the world, it may be five years. Regulators may also issue documents requiring
publicly audited non-audit services and specific fee rates for each service to manage and
adjust in necessary cases, ensuring healthy competition; or for public interest entities, when
disclosing financial statements, the audit fee should be clearly stated in the notes to the
financial statements. There should be specific regulations on the implementation of annual
audits on the quality of financial statements audited by audit firms. Selection criteria may be
based on: the audit period in a company more than 03 years; the audit firm provides both
audit service and non-audit services; .....
Secondly, the study serves to enhance the awareness of users and auditors about the
contextual factors surrounding the role of an auditor, in addition to the possible threats and
enhancement factors that affect PAI. For audit firm, when selecting audit team members,
a commitment must be made to ensure the auditor independence; it is necessary to develop
a specific basis for the calculation and determination of fees in accordance with audit and
non-audit servicesFor users of financial statements, consideration should be given when
choosing an audit and non-audit service provider, if possible choose two different
companies to implement these two services; regularly reviewing and changing auditing
companies over time in accordance with the law to ensure independence and quality of
auditing.
This study has several limitations. First, this study investigates the perceptions of the
factors influencing PAI of five objects using financial reports. Other users, such as
academics, financial analysts, economists, tax officials, policy makers are not covered
in this study. Second, the samples were drawn only from institutions that were willing to
take part. Consequently, the results might not be applicable to those that did not take part
in the study. Third, data were collected using a survey questionnaire which may affect the
reliability of the respondents’ answers. So, researchs in the future should to contribute the
linear regression for estimating the level of influence on the auditor independence.
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